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PREFACE 
This work is a study of the cotton and wheat markets of the World War One 
era. Subjects including acreage, production, prices, and value of crops were 
studied. The relationship between the commodities producers and the 
government was also an area taken into consideration. The lobbying efforts of 
the cotton and wheat producers also were subjects for analysis. The study 
utilized figures on both national and state commodities production although the 
main subject of study was the impact of the World War upon the cotton and 
wheat markets of Oklahoma. 
I wish to express my sincere gratitude to all those associated with this 
study. In particular, I am especially indebted to my committee chairman, Dr. 
Roger Biles, who went above and beyond the call of duty in his assistance. I am 
also grateful for the help provided by my other committee members, Dr. John 
Sylvester and Dr. Etta Perkins. 
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In the opening days of World War One the responses of America's cotton 
and wheat markets to the conflict were in stark contrast. One contemporary 
author was particularly incisive in his analysis of the situation surrounding the 
commodities markets following the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914. James A. 
Scherer offered a simple and acceptable explanation for the chaos in the 
commodity exchanges in 1914 in his Cotton as a World Power (1916).1 Scherer 
argued that at the outbreak of the war, most individuals, including those in the 
commodity exchanges and in the government, at first were more concerned with 
food supplies, and only later began to take notice of cotton supplies.2 This initial 
gut response is an apt description of how the cotton and wheat markets 
responded to the news of war in Europe. 
When news of war in Europe first reached the United States, the first 
responses of the cotton and wheat markets were completely different. The initial 
response of the cotton market was that the commodity's price plummeted fifty 
percent. To prevent a complete collapse of cotton prices the cotton exchanges 
in New York, New Orleans, and Liverpool closed while the nervous traders met 
to analyze the situation and to hammer out solutions.3 In sharp contrast to the 
maladies affecting the cotton markets, the price of wheat doubled as speculators 
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moved to cash· in on the nervousness sweeping the world. How did the 
government respond to these rapidly changing conditions? 
The United States government faced in August 1914 a situation that had 
never occurred before, war amongst the leading industrial powers of the 
twentieth century. As cotton slumped and wheat skyrocketed, the government 
modified its policies concerning these commodities. The question is whether 
these policies were balanced, or did they favor one commodity or the other? 
Were the programs the government offered effective cures or just band-aids far 
ills that required more comprehensive solutions? Did the government see the 
need to maintain stable prices or did the government help the wheat farmers 
and speculators make huge profits at the expense of war-torn Europe? Was the 
government ready ta provide innovative leadership or was it still in the grips of 
laissez-faire doctrine? Did the government fall ta the same short-sightedness as 
the general public and think more of food supplies than of how ta keep the 
cotton markets op~n and viable? This researcher's opinion is that the 
government did not approach the problems of the cotton and wheat markets with 
anything that can be considered even-handedness. 
It is this researcher's opinion that the government did succumb to the same 
pressures affecting the world and that it moved to maintain and protect the wheat 
markets mare than the cotton markets. While this conclusion is hardly 
earth-stopping, the process of the policy being implemented is quite interesting. 
Another question that arises is haw did the cotton and wheat producers react to 
the situation. 
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How did the cotton and wheat farmers respond to the war's effect upon 
their markets? How did they feel as markets evaporated and prices dwindled? 
How did they respond to expanding markets? What programs did they develop 
as a response to the crisis? Were their responses economically sound or the 
result of frantic hastily-made decisions? What was the relationship between the 
commodities producers and the government? Symbiotic or parasitic? Why 
were the cotton producers unable to engage in more effective damage-control 
as their export markets disappeared and prices plunged? 
At the other extreme, why were not the wheat farmers more effective in 
preventing the fixing of the price of wheat when wheat prices experienced a 
second sharp increase when the United States entered the war in 1917? 
Another factor to study was the varying effectiveness of the cotton and wheat 
producers' lobbies, and their wildly contrasting responses to cotton and wheat 
market conditions following the outbreak of war in Europe. Who was better at 
presenting their case, the cotton producers or the wheat farmers? ~ho was 
better represented in the government, the sharecropping tenant farmer or the 
heavily capitalized wheat producer? 
Elaborating on the subject, what other factors were involved in the cotton 
and wheat markets? How did the cost of labor fit in? Did the way in which 
markets operate influence their susceptibility to political upheavals? How did 
the availability of maritime shipping affect the cotton and wheat markets? What 
sources are available for a study of the cotton and wheat markets of World War 
One? 
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One of the most important sources for this study was the collected papers 
of Robert L. Williams, Governor of Oklahoma from 1914 to 1918. Williams kept a 
sizeable number of letters from his constituents and critics, as well as many 
penned by his own hand. The Governor's papers are of vital importance, 
because they are an excellent source for establishing linkages between the 
commodities producers and the state level of government, and then on to the 
national level of government. Several recommendations of _the commoditjes 
producers can be traced through the state level of government and on through 
the channels of government with a few eventually reaching President Wilson's 
desk. 
Other sources on the state level include the papers of several members of 
the state legislature. These individuals, close to the public, were especially 
sensitive to the outcries of the commodities producers. Any legislation on the 
state level regarding commodities would pass under the guise of these 
individuals. 
Tracing the linkage to the national level this study also has utilized the 
papers of Oklahoma Senator Thomas P. Gore. Any legislation dealing with the 
commodities markets was of vital importance for Gore, the chairman of the 
Senate Committee on Agriculture. Unfortunately, Gore's reputation as a 
legislative maverick prevented him from having as large an impact on 
commodities legislation as one would infer from Gore's position in the Senate. 
Still, Gore's name was prominent in the many debates that centered upon the 
cotton and wheat markets. 
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Oklahoma also had several individuals in the United States House of 
Representatives involved in commodities legislation. Richard T. Morgan was a 
strong supporter of Oklahoma's wheat farmers, and Scott Ferris showed a keen 
interest in any legislation that dealt with the commodities markets. One of the 
more colorful representatives from Oklahoma was William "Alfalfa Bill" Murray. 
Murray gave many speeches concerning .cotton- and wheat-related subjects. 
Murray was also one of those in Congress who advocated the need to expand 
the merchant marine. His papers are littered with references to the need to 
increase the amount of shipping tonnage available to the commodities export 
trade. 
The various publications dealing with commodities trading also provide an 
excellent source of information on the cotton and wheat markets of World War 
One. While seldom totally objective, the various periodicals, journals, and 
newspapers that covered commodities trading during the war offer additional 
insight into the period. The proposals and suggestions that the market analysts 
came up with were varied. Depending on whose interests the publication 
served, each journal and newspaper had a solution to the complex and 
bewildering circumstances surrounding the cotton and wheat exchanges. 
Programs to help cotton growers, ways to keep markets open, and how the 
government should respond all fell within the ideas espoused by the various 
publications. 
While many of the publications'. ideas were impractical, several were the 
result of sound analysis, uninhibited by the frantic helplessness displayed by the 
cotton growers. Also, the publications of the era provide the researcher an 
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opportunity to study a chronological record of the cotton and wheat markets, as 
well as the editorial responses to them. But best of all, the literature of the era 
provides the historian with a better understanding of the attitudes and feelings of 
the nation as it reacted to this unprecedented situation. The Commercial and 
Financial Chronicle was most helpful on both the national and state level, while 
the Oklahoma Farmer-Stockman was one of several excellent sources for 
information regarding conditions in Oklahoma. To fill the gaps between these 
sources, various secondary sources have been utilized in order to provide the 
reader with a more complete understanding of the cotton and wheat markets of 
the World War One era. But why study Oklahoma, and why study cotton and 
wheat only? 
As for Oklahoma, it is an excellent subject for an analysis of cotton and 
wheat trading on the state level. This is true because of the uniqueness of 
Oklahoma in respect to cotton and wheat production. Oklahoma is situated 
geographically on the northwestern fringe of the cotton producing section of the 
United States. In regards to wheat, Oklahoma lies near the southern fringe of 
the wheat belt.· This overlapping of the cotton and wheat belts in Oklahoma 
provides the opportunity to study the interrelation and contrasts of these 
important commodities on the state level that few if any other states can provide. 
But then another question arises, why study the cotton and wheat markets of 
World War One? 
It was from the major works covering World War One that this researcher 
received the inspiration and direction needed for a study of cotton and 
wheat-related aspects of the war. The study began with an interest in foreign 
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policy and especially the economic aspects and influences that shaped United 
States foreign policy during World War One. Works such as Charles Beard's 
The Devil Theory of War, and Wayne S. Cole's Senator Gerald P, Nye and 
American Foreign Relations were influential for this researcher. These works 
emphasized the role that the financiers and munition makers had in increasing 
United States involvement in the war. These are now well-worn areas of 
research, with little prospect of new ground being broken. But to take the 
research one step further, one must study the primary raw materials that war is 
ultimately waged with. All finished goods begin with raw materials, and in cotton 
and wheat there are two of the most vital raw materials for waging war. Wheat 
eventually becomes bread, providing subsistence for those at the front. As for 
cotton, besides clothing and sheltering the soldier, it is a vital component in 
gunpowder, and warfare consumes it in huge quantities. One author noted that 
a company of three hundred soldiers carried the equivalent of three bales of 
cotton in the form of ammunition. An even more impressive figure is that a 
twelve-inch naval gun consumed a half-bale of cotton per shot and that a 
battleship at full firing capacity used ten to t\'.Velve bales of cotton per minute.4 
With this information in mind it quickly becomes apparent how vitally 
important these commodities are in war, and how belligerents will do anything to 
curtail the enemies' supply of both. A nation deprived of either would soon 
succumb to the victor. Thus, it is easier to understand by Britain and Germany 
went to such lengths to prevent each other from controlling the supply of these 
commodities. Germany's submarine warfare campaign was a policy with a 
simple goal in mind - to deprive Britain of the food and materials needed to 
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continue the struggle. Brutally effective, the strategy and the possibility of 
success had it not eventually led to United States entry into the conflict. Even 
after the United States had entered the war Britain was precariously close to 
starvation by 1918, and the situation on the continent was even worse. 
Britain's minefields and naval blockade had a devastating effect on 
Germany's ability to feed herself. With Russian and French sources cut off, 
Germany found herself short of wheat. Poor harvests and the continuing British 
blockade only aggravated the situation. Strict state control of grain production 
and the milling process stretched the dwindling supply, but these measures 
failed to overcome the huge obstacles involved in feeding the German 
population. 5 
The British blockade also severely affected Germany's supply of cotton. In 
August 1913 the United States exported 72,928 bales of cotton to Germany. 
Immediately after the outbreak of the war in Europe the United States exports to 
Germany shrank to 52 bales of .cotton. In January 1914 the United States 
exported $308, 116 worth of cotton to Germany. In January 1915 this figure had 
shrunk to $99,919. By March 1915, United States cotton exports to Germany 
were down to a trickle, only $6, 112 for that month. 6 In the following months 
United States exports of cotton to Germany stopped completely. Although 
Germany began the war with a substantial stockpile of cotton, its supplies soon 
dwindled.7 But as cotton exports to Germany disappeared new markets opened 
up in the United Kingdom. 
In January 1914 the United States exported $437,231 worth of raw cotton 
to Britain. This figure grew to $585,534 in January 1915. In February 1915 
9 
cotton exports to Britain mushroomed to a value of $2,414,619. This can be 
compared to the $88,508 worth exported to Germany in the same month.a 
While new British demand more than made up for lost markets in Germany, one 
would expect cotton prices to at least hold steady or more likely rise after the 
outbreak of war in Europe. But initially this was far from what happened. 
Cotton had been selling for 13 1/4 cents per pound in July 1914. Because 
of hot dry weather in Oklahoma and Texas, prices were rising, and the prospects 
for a strong market were good.9 When news of war in Europe reached the 
United States at the end of July, 1914, the mood in the cotton markets was 
generally optimistic. Most traders considered news of war a "bearish factor'', and 
combined with the dry weather in Oklahoma and Texas, they expected the price 
of cotton rise sharply.10 But with the foreign exchanges in turmoil, the opposite 
resulted. 
As noted before, the cotton exchanges closed as prices plummeted, 50 
points or one-half cent, with the initial news of the war.11 The reason for closing 
the exchanges was that it was necessary due to the "panicky condition in the 
United States."12 By August 4, all United States cotton exports to Europe 
ceased as the price continued to drop throughout the.month, bottoming out at six 
to seven cents per pound.13 Within a month cotton prices slumped to only 
one-half their value of only a few weeks before. This figure becomes even more 
significant when it is noted that at this time a rise or fall of one cent in the price of 
cotton represented $100,000,000 in lost or gained income to the cotton 
growers.14 While the United States cotton crop for 1914 had a value of 
$519,616,000, it could have been worth over one billion 1914 dollars had the 
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war in Europe not so drastically affected United States cotton prices.15 With 
two-thirds of America's cotton crop exported, it is not surprising to see cotton 
values drop as European markets vanished.16 
Another contributing factor in the massive drop in price was that 1914 was 
a bumper crop for cotton. The cotton belt's production reached nearly sixteen 
and one-half million bales, a record crop.17 This super abundance was sure to 
have lowered the price of cotton on its own, but in combination with the 
European war, prices dropped to record lows when World War One broke out in 
1_914.18 Plans and programs were quickly devised as the cotton growers 
sought to salvage what they could from their 1914 crop. Left with a h~ge 
surplus, no European markets, and a depressed domestic market, their 
prospects for the future were bleak. Later chapters of this study will develop 
more fully the cotton growers and government's responses to the cotton crisis. 
But for the moment it is more beneficial to study how the wheat market 
responded to the news of the war in Europe in the summer of 1914. 
The wheat market reacted to news of war in Europe in a markedly different 
fashion than the cotton market did. While market analysts were speaking in 
optimistic terms about cotton in July, 1914, their assessment of the wheat market 
was quite the opposite. The Commercial and Financial Chronicle reported on 
July 18, 1914 that the wheat "market certainly lacks snap and interest."19 Most 
market analysts expected lower prices as a record wheat crop was beginning to 
be harvested.20 But circumstances quickly changed as The Commercial and 
Financial Chronicle noted that the war in Europe had led to sharp increases in 
grain prices. 21 
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Indeed, the price of wheat did go up nine cents on Tuesday, July 28 alone. 
Increasing European demand was driving the price of wheat upward. But while 
prices rose, traders remained nervous. Most were uncertain of what was to 
come. The Commercial and Financial Chronicle commented that the wheat 
market was "active, excited, and irregular, but on the whole decidedly higher."22 
But many were fearful of a cutoff of the European market as the cotton growers 
had experienced. The Commercial and Financial Chronicle captured a sense of 
the times with its statement that precedents were of little use as the world had 
never seen "such a gigantic war as now appals (sic) the civilized world."23 
Wheat was selling for less than a dollar a bushel when war erupted in 
Europe in 1914. But within a week it was already ranging as high as 105 1 /4 
cents per bushel. Accusations of speculation then began to fill the air of the 
wheat markets. The Commercial and Financial Chronicle remarked that "if the 
banks did not finance those back of speculation, it could never be 
maintained".25 On August 15, 1914, President Wilson, commenting on the 
rising price of wheat, stated that "the country ought to be pefended, if possible, 
against men who would take advantage of such circumstances to increase the 
price of food and the difficulties of living."26 But it would not be until 1917 and 
United States entry into the war that the federal government would move to 
impose price controls upon wheat and other goods important to the war effort. In 
this uninhibited market visions of huge profits filled the heads of many wheat 
farmers and traders. 
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle noted that western farmers were 
looking forward fo $1.50 per bushel wheat in the future.27 The Oklahoma 
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Farmer was even more optimistic. It predicted on August 10th that "there can be 
no question but that the price will soon go to $2 a bushel, and possibly still 
higher."28 The Oklahoma Farmer went on to comment that "farmers who held 
their wheat for better prices will be rewarded for their trouble."29 
As prices rose most individuals associated with the wheat markets 
immediately noted the influence the war in Europe was having on grain prices. 
Wheat that had been selling in July 1914 for 83 to 97 cents in Chicago, and as 
low as 70 cents in Oklahoma, was selling for $1.32 per bushel within a few 
weeks. 30 With no end in sight for rising prices the Oklahoma Farmer-Stockman 
suggested that the wheat farmers hold their product off the market. Waiting, not 
selling, was the best option for the wheat farmer according to Carl Williams, 
editor of the Oklahoma Farmer-Stockman. 31 His assessment that Europe could 
not fight and grow wheat at the same time held true for the most part throughout 
the war. Generally everyone involved in the wheat markets realized that the 
prosperity was war-based, but few felt remorse. The Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle reported cynically that "Europe must get from us - notably our 
wheat."33 
In the opening weeks of the war in Europe The Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle remarked that in regards to wheat prices there was a "general belief in 
the trade that if the war continued there is nothing for it but higher prices."34 
While the government recognized that speculation was permeating the wheat 
markets, it was reluctant to limit wheat prices. On the other end of the spectrum, 
the government was just as slow to move to shore up cotton prices as it was to 
limit wheat prices. But certain changes were in the air. While The Commercial 
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and Financial Chronicle could claim that there was no antagonism between 
government and business, it still remarked that the prevalent attitude of business 
was "to save itself from being throttled."35 Only slowly would the government 
move to moderate both markets. 
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CHAPTER II 
COTION, WHEAT, AND AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, 1914-1917 
There were stark differences in the government's policies toward the cotton 
and wheat farmers during the period of American neutrality in World War One. 
When the cotton exchanges closed, the government moved with little urgency in 
its efforts to restore the cotton grower's markets. The plans it did offer the cotton 
growers were limited. While the government did little to restore slumping prices, 
it formulated its policies so that the wheat farmers could take full advantage of 
rising wheat prices. Concern about food supplies, more than any other reason, 
kept the government's attention firmly fixed in the wheat farmer's direction. At 
the same time, the cotton growers faced a gamut of problems, all related to the 
outbreak of war in Europe. 
As the impact of the war in Europe became fully understood, the cotton 
growers of the South found themselves in a position that was far from enviable. 
European markets had vanished almost overnight, huge surpluses existed, as 
did a depressed domestic market. Many were uncertain of the times that lay 
ahead. The United States had been exporting about 10,000,000 bales annually 
in the years preceding 1914, but the World War had closed Europe's markets to 
American cotton. The immediate effects were quickly assessed by all those 
concerned, and all agreed the loss of European markets was having a 
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devastating effect on United States cotton producers. The press was able to 
convey a sense of the situation that the cotton producers were experiencing. 
The Oklahoma Farmer-Stockman noted on August 10, 1914 that with the 
loss of the European markets the "bottom is due to fall out of (the) cotton market, 
in consequence."1 The Oklahoma Farmer expressed a general perception 
when it remarked that the "cotton men have no market". Cotton prices in 
southern Oklahoma were down from 13 1/4 cents per pound to seven to eight 
cents per pound, with cotton lint selling for as low as two to three cents per 
pound. 2 Harlow's Weekly acknowledged the differing responses of cotton and 
wheat prices to the war when it concluded that while Oklahoma would lose on 
the cotton market, it was hoping that high grain prices might compensate for 
losses encountered on the cotton markets. 3 Harlow's Weekly went on to 
comment that Oklahoma had been "badly hurt by (the) war." Cotton markets, 
according to Harlow's Weekly, were "very disturbed."4 This was the general 
sentiment, and it kept the cotton exchanges closed until November 1914. Many 
feared that a reopening of the exchanges would instigate a further drop of cotton 
prices as Southerners dumped their 1914 crop on a shrunken market.5 Cotton 
growers who had expected the war to increase demand for their product were 
experiencing just the opposite. Only a few spokesmen commented that it had 
been an error to expect the war to increase demand. 
George Bishop, a contributor to both the Oklahoma Fwmer-Stockman and 
the Oklahoma Farm Journal, contended in an editorial dated September 15, 
1914 that the war would decrease demand for cotton. Bishop argued that in the 
initial stages of the war demand for cotton was likely to be reduced, and that a 
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surplus was to be expected. This was what did occur in 1914. Bishop also 
predicted that Europe's immediate demands would be for food. This would 
reduce demand for cotton even further, as would the deaths of millions of 
combatants. But, as Bishop noted, "There is a possibility for this fight to continue 
to the point of almost extermination before it is over," and that the need to 
provide tents for millions of soldiers was sure to have an impact on cotton 
demand.6 With the European markets closed, the cotton growers of the United 
States and Oklahoma began to search for solution to the predicament that they 
faced in the fall of 1914. 
In the fall of 1914 the Oklahoma cotton crop for that year was estimated to 
be somewhere around 1,250,000 bales. What were they to do with all of it? 
Many agreed with the Oklahoma farmer-Stockman's comments that an 
anarchist's bullet had "killed the hopes and blasted the prosperity of many 
southwestern cotton farmers."7 But what responses were to be formulated as a 
reaction to the crisis? One of the first goals was to somehow reduce the glut of 
cotton on the market. 
Proposals on how to reduce the cotton surplus came in several forms. 
Some were well conceived, rational programs, while others were the result of 
frantic thinking. Others sought ways to exploit the sagging cotton market to their 
own benefit. The growers themselves, the bankers, the press, and the 
government all had their own solutions to the problem. 
Three of the more popular proposals made in the effort to alleviate the 
cotton grower's woes were a moratorium on debts: the "Buy a Bale" program; 
and some sort of program where cotton could be warehoused, and then the 
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warehouse receipt could be used as a form of currency until cotton prices 
rebounded. 8 But major problems were inherent in all of the programs. Few 
were willing to accept a moratorium on debts, especially the bankers who held 
these debts. A price had to be settled upon by which the "Buy a Bale" program 
could operate. But the most important of these programs was the emergency 
warehouse credits program. 
In the emergency warehouse credits program cotton growers hoped to 
accomplish several goals. First, it would keep cotton off the market and prevent 
further decline of prices. Second, it would allow the cotton grower to hold his 
cotton until prices rebounded. Third, it would put cash into the cotton grower's 
hands. Without some sort of aid the cotton farmers were likely to be unable to 
pay off the loans they had contracted throughout 1914. 
In early August, 1914, the plans designed to help the cotton grower began 
to take shape. The August 8, 1914 issue of The Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle reported that the President of the Southern Congress was appealing 
for government aid to help prevent the continuation of slumping oil prices.1 0 
The cry from the cotton growers for a warehouse credits program reached to all 
levels of government. Because cotton growers, bankers, and retailers all had an 
interest in the bill, the debates concerning the program were long and lively. 
The warehouse credits program passed, but only after considerable discussion 
and deliberation. 
The cotton crisis was troublesome for a large section of the United States. 
Because of similar interests, the cotton growers and state governments of the 
. . 
South combined together in an effort to stabilize cotton prices. A letter from 
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Governor O.B. Colquitt of Texas to Governor Robert L. Williams of Oklahoma 
emphasized that both Texas and Oklahoma exported all their cotton, and that 
. Oklahoma was soon to "feel the pinch" of the cotton crisis. Colquitt went on to 
ask Williams to use all his "influence with Senator Robert L. Owen of Oklahoma 
to amend the emergency warehouse bill to allow issuance of emergency 
currency on warehouse receipts guaranteed by the state. The Governor of 
Texas also ordered the Attorney General of Texas to send Governor Williams a 
copy of the cotton warehouse bm.11 Other lobbying from south of the Red River 
included a letter from the Director bf the Extension Department of Texas A&M 
commenting on the difficulty of marketing the 1914 cotton crop, and asking 
Governor Williams to do whatever he could d.o to aid the embattled cotton 
farmer.12 
Because uncertainty surrounded the cotton warehouse credits program, 
some politicians favored going slowly until the situation became more stable. 
But conditions were severe enough that Oklahoma Congressman William H. 
Murray wrote to one state legislator to chastise him for recommending that the 
government "go a little slow" on relief for the cotton growers. Murray took the 
exact opposite viewpoint. He advised that the best way to deal with the cotton 
situation was that "we had better go a little fast." Murray went on to state that if 
aid were not immediately forthcoming, bankruptcy was in the future for the cotton 
growers.13 
One of the main goals of the cotton warehouse credits program was to 
remove enough cotton from the market to halt the skid of prices and then to keep 
the price at least even with the cost of production which was 9 1/2 to 10 cents 
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per pound.14 In a letter to Congressman Murray a Wanette, Oklahoma lawyer 
argued that 1 O cents was a "fair price."15 Murray himself recommended in a 
letter to J.W. Hundley that it was important to hold the price of cotton at no less 
than 1 O cents per pound. Murray contended this was necessary so that the 
"Wall Street speculators" would not profit from depressed cotton prices. But 
Murray went on to comment that representatives from the cotton producing 
states numbered less than one-fourth of the members of the Congress and that 
the plight of the cotton growing states was of little interest to the rest of the 
nation. Murray perfectly assessed the mood in Washington toward the cotton 
growers when he stated that "the federal government has never done anything_ 
directly for the cotton producer and I fear it never will."16 
Murray's pessimistic comment clearly highlights the difficulties the cotton 
grower faced in Washington and across the nation. One constituent wrote to 
Murray voicing his support of the cotton warehouse credits program, but in the 
very next paragraph he proclaimed his opposition to taxing cotton to raise its 
price. Merchants were especially virulent in their opposition to taxing cotton. A 
Boswell, Oklahoma merchant complained in a letter to Governor Williams that it 
was not fair to tax cotton held by merchants while the cotton held by farmers was 
exempt from taxation.17 His recommendation was typical of the laissez-faire 
attitudes that dominated the opposition of aid to the cotton growers. 
Governor Williams made substantial efforts to pass on comments on the 
cotton grower's plight to Oklahoma's representatives in Washington. Williams 
argued in a letter to Congressman Joseph 8. Thompson of Oklahoma that 
government aid to the cotton growers was needed to overcome the "depression 
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brought about by the war in Europe." Williams emphasized that the cotton 
grower's situation could be helped "by governmental aid and governmental 
influence ... "18 Thompson's return letter acknowledged the anxiety that many 
cotton producers were feeling, and he expressed his hope that the warehouse 
credits legislation would restore cotton prices to 1 O cents per pound. Thompson 
also warned that low cotton prices were driving the cotton farmers of southern 
Oklahoma into the socialist camp, and conditions in Pottawatomie County were 
such, Thompson mentioned, that "socialism is a little bit rampant" there.19 
Not all those in government were as inclined to aid the cotton growers as 
the politicians hailing from the cotton producing states. Many felt that Sl:JCh aid 
violated laissez-faire doctrine. Others feared the precedent of ·aiding the 
producers of any particular commodity. Individuals who early on in the crisis 
had rallied to the side of the cotton grower soon backed off from their initial 
support. W.P.G. Harding, then a member of the Federal Reserve Board, stated 
on August 15, 1914 that emergency notes "can be put to excellent use in saving 
the cotton crop from the sort of disaster which must come if the export trade is 
blockaded and if the cotton belt is forced to pay off its loans."20 By early 
October, Harding had changed his tune. At a meeting with the National 
Association of Cotton Manufacturers, Harding advised the South to pay more 
attention to the production of foodstuffs. Harding emphasized that cotton was 
not "as supremely and immediately necessary as foodst!Jffs," and the cotton 
grower's best option was ·to switch to these products.21 
Secretary of Agriculture David F. Houston also expressed the federal 
government's opposition to aiding the cotton growers. On September 27, 1914, 
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Houston stated that "the Government has done all it can do. The Government 
cannot play favorites, even at a time like this. It cannot decree that the price of 
cotton shall be 12 cents a pound, because the growers of the staple think that it 
is worth that much ... 22 Houston also believed that the cotton growers best bet 
was to diversify their crops and "to increase their products of foodstuffs so far as 
possible ... 23 
Secretary of the Treasury William G. McAdoo was no more sympathetic to 
the cotton grower than was the Secretary of Agriculture. When a group of 
Southern Congressmen proposed the valorization of the cotton crop and 
mentioned a figure of $500,000,000, the Secretary of the Treasury was quick to 
speak out against this plan. McAdoo argued that if the government valorized 
cotton it "would have to valorize everything - canned salmon, wheat, corn - but it 
is a perfectly wild and ridiculous expedient, and should not be resorted to in any 
circumstances."24 A few days later McAdoo continued his crusade against 
cotton relief when he commented that "I am firmly convinced that neither 
additional nor unlimited issues of paper money will help the cotton planter. It is 
impossible by legislation to create a market for cotton or to establish a price for 
it."25 But governmental opposition to aid for the cotton growers did not stop at 
the cabinet level; it also existed in the White House. 
Woodrow Wilson may have been innovative and willing to try new ideas 
when it came to international politics, but he comes out looking more like a 
conservative if one examines his attitudes toward the cotton growers in the fall of 
1914. When the President of the National Farmers' Union, C.S. Barett, wrote 
Wilson and appealed for government loans directly to cotton growers, the 
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President expressed his reluctance to aid the distressed farmers. Wilson said it 
would be a mistake to "make some radical departure from sound economic 
practice." Wilson went on to comment that "we have got to make sacrifices, not 
fundamental mistakes."26 Wilson put this philosophy into practice when he 
rejected the cotton valorization proposal. 27 
So while Wilson was opposed to direct aid to the cotton growers, he did 
agree with Postmaster General Burleson's opinion that it was important to 
somehow keep three to four million bales of co~on off the market, because the 
alternative was "to thrust this on the market would break cotton prices to the 
detriment of all, for on the cotton crop we depend for our credit balance of 
gold. n28 Confronted with arguments like this, Wilson agreed to allow McAdoo 
. and the Treasury Department to issue emergency currency to the banks at 75 
percent of cash value of warehouse receipts. Incidentally the figure of 75 
percent was the same percentage that the Southern Cotton Congress had 
endorsed two weeks earlier. 29 During the month of August, 1914, 
$141, 171,959 worth of emergency currency was issued under the 
Aldrich-Vreeland· Act. This was out of a total of $203,000,000 issued to the 
banks, so nearly 75 percent of the monies in the program were distributed in the 
first month of the program's existence.30 
Although governmental opposition to aid for the cotton growers was vocal, 
the business press was more vicious in its attacks on relief for the cotton 
growers. The Commercial and Financial Chronicle opposed the warehouse 
credits program from its beginning and only grudgingly gave the program 
support once it was enacted. Late in August, 1914, Chronicle editorials began 
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to complain about the program. Speaking of the cotton growers the Chronicle 
argued "but why should he not be obliged to accept the situation instead of (the) 
extraordinary measures being devised to enable him to realize on the cotton 
before it is actually sold, and thus get him deeper into debt?" In other editorials 
the Chronicle went on to state that "producers always have extravagant ideas as 
to what they ought to get for their output, and that has been particularly true in 
the case of cotton producers."32 Considering that cotton prices were well below 
the cost of production and there were not even any markets at that price, the 
Chronicle's criticisms seem unwarranted. But the criticisms continued on in the 
same fashion. 
Only a week later the Chronicle was declaring that "no human power can 
control, regulate, or modify price tendencies until the law of supply and demand 
is repealed,"33 - a statement that would have warmed Adam Smith's heart. But 
the Chronicle saved its best rhetoric for the warehouse program. Its editorials 
argued that the plan was a "fictitious arrangement for financing the crop."34 
Despite a harshness of its criticism, the Chronicle did appreciate the cotton 
man's plight in Washington when it remarked that "all sorts of panaceas have 
been suggested by Southern Governors and Congressmen, but they are 
receiving no encouragement at Washington. "35 
But why did the please of the cotton farmers fall upon deaf ears? Were 
foodstuffs so important that little was done to alleviate the cotton man's woes? 
Had cotton been "King Cotton" for so long that the government did not consider 
the problems of the cotton grower serious enough to warrant a helping hand 
from the government? The $203,000,000 emergency warehouse credits 
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program did little to solve the cotton producer's problems. It did nothing to 
address the major issue which was the lack of foreign markets due to the war in 
Europe. Because the warehouse credits loans were made on the basis of six 
cents per pound, the cotton growers were not even able to cover their production 
costs. It was apparent that the federal government was not going to offer the 
cotton growers any sort of comprehensive program. The merchant classes also 
had little sympathy for the cotton farmers. 
The owner of a hardware company in Forth Worth commented that the 
"farmer has (the) right to hold his cotton until doomsday if he does not owe 
anything, but no right to hold it if he owes debts."36 With this attitude one can 
easily surmise the opinion of the merchant classes when one cotton grower, R.L. 
Thompson, suggested that the manufacturers should help because they were 
the only "class" that could help the cotton planters. Thompson recommended 
that the textile mills buy a five year supply of cotton to reduce the glut.37 With 
th~ federal government and the manufacturers reluctant to aid the cotton 
growers, the producers of that staple came to the conclusion that they had to 
devise their own remedies for the cotton crisis. These actions were what 
ultimately restored the cotton market in 1915 and 1916. 
The impact of the cutoff of cotton exports to Europe cannot be exaggerated. 
The Commercial And Financial Chronicle remarked that because of the 
cessation of demand from Europe, cotton had become "for the time being, a 
more or less unmarketable staple."38 Out of the 15 million baie crop of 1914 
from five to six million bales were surplus.39 What was to be done with the 
excess? 
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One solution was the "Buy a Bale" program. In the program those who 
could afford it purchased cotton at 1 O cents per pound and then were to hold it 
off the market until the glut diminished. Both corporations and individuals 
participated in the program. The American Tobacco Company offered to 
purchase the equivalent of two months' sales of all its competitors combined. 40 
But while large companies could engage in a sort of playful competition 
regarding the "Buy a Bale" program, others had far more at stake than two 
months' sales. The "Buy a Bale" program was fairly successful in temporarily 
removing excess cotton from the market, but it was more successful at drawing 
attention to the cotton grower's plight than it was at restoring cotton prices to 
their pre-war levels. 
A letter to outgoing Oklahoma Governor Lee Cruce in 1914 dramatizes the 
situation the small cotton farmer faced. In a pathetic handwritten note a cotton 
grower who described himself as a "criple" (sic) appealed to Cruce to buy a bale 
of cotton from him. Complaining that current prices would not cover his 
production costs the cotton planter continued his plea with "(the) Bible says to 
ask and you shall receive. So I have ask and I am hoping to receive ... 41 The 
Governor, claiming personal financial hardship, declined to buy the cotton, and 
then told the cotton planter that the real problem was a "lack of cotton market"42 
- as if a cotton producer had to be told that. The cotton growers were coming to 
the realization that they were not going to be saved by the government. It was 
then that the cotton growers began to formulate their own response to the crisis. 
Faced with warehouses already bulging with surplus cotton and the 
government advocating the increased production of foodstuffs, the cotton 
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growers of Oklahoma were not slow to heed the message. But Oklahoma 
farmers were indecisive about what crop they would plant instead of cotton. The 
Oklahoma Farm Journal recommended that because of the over-supply of cotton 
and the resulting low prices that "wheat or oats for the cotton farmer are 
undoubtedly his next best bet." Many Oklahoma cotton growers accepted this 
advice as well as the prevailing market conditions and planted nearly one 
million fewer acres of cotton in 1915 than they did in 1914. This represented a 
crop of one-third in acreage dedicated to cotton production. 43 At the same time 
acres planted in wheat increased by 500,000 in Oklahoma. The Oklahoma 
Farmer-Stockman remarked that virtually all of the increase in wheat acreage 
was "from land usually planted in cotton."44 
The Oklahoma farmer-Stockman also advocated that Oklahoma farmers 
switch from low priced cotton to high priced wheat.45 The Oklahoma 
Farmer-Stockman advertising even reflected the switch from cotton. One seed 
salesman recommended that cotton growers "plant Sudan grass instead of 
cotton."46 Others remarked that because of a lack of markets and low prices, 
cotton was a poor choice for 1915 and recommended Kafir, arguing it was more 
profitable and much easier to sell. 47 
The Oklahoma cotton grower's efforts to cut cotton production and the 
surplus by reducing acreage were largely successful. 1915 production fell to 
only half that of 1914. Carried out on a national scale, this practice restored 
prices to their pre-war levels by the fall of 1915. While the price of cotton in 
Oklahoma in 1914 had bottomed out at 6.85 cents per pound, it was up to 11.12 
cents per pound in 1915.48 But reduced acreage did not completely solve the 
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cotton grower's woes. What he needed was his European markets, and that 
meant government assistance. 
The disruption of maritime insurance and lack of a large merchant marine 
were major obstacles in the efforts to restore cotton exports to Europe. Because 
private firms refused to underwrite maritime insurance after the opening 
hostilities of the conflict, United States maritime shipping virtually halted in the 
fall of 1914. E.N. Hurley of the Foreign Trade Council advocated that the United 
States government assume war risk insurance or "if this is not done the price of 
commodities will be absolutely controlled by that government which hauls our 
cargos."49 The Harris-Irby Cotton Company of Oklahoma City recommended to 
Senator Thomas P. Gore that he press the issue of having the Government Risk 
Bureau underwrite insurance on cotton shipments to neutrals so trade could 
continue.SO 
Besides the lack of insurance, cotton exporters also lost cotton markets 
because of a lack of United States merchant shipping. Congressman Murray 
identified the lack of United States merchant shipping as a problem for the 
cotton growers in letters to his friends and associates back in Oklahoma. In one 
letter Murray mentioned that when the war broke out the belligerents refused to 
carry cotton "contraband," and United States shipping could not make up the 
difference. 51 The Louisiana Railway and Navigation Company complained in a 
letter to Governor Lee Cruce that because of the shipping shortages relat~d to 
the European war the cotton exporting states had lost $1 O million dollars. The 
note continued with a plea for the state and federal governments to "take action" 
on the matter. 52 
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The cotton growers certainly needed action on the matter, since the cotton 
market had virtually come to a standstill. The Hugo, Oklahoma cotton market is 
a good example of the situation. Only 1 S40 bales were bought and sold there 
from January 1, 1914 through October 2, 1914. This was less than one-third of 
the 4906 bales traded up to that date in 1913. S3 
There were willing buyers in Europe, but because of a lack of shipping the 
cotton growers of the South were unable to market their product. Germany 
desperately wanted to resume the purchase of United States cotton. Stockpiles 
at Bremen had dwindled from 443,000 bales in 1913 to BS,000 bales in 1914. 
Textile mills became idle as raw cotton became scarce in Germany.S4 Governor 
Williams assessed the market accurately when he stated that the war was 
"destroying" our cotton market.SS Eventually the federal government did 
assume the responsibility of underwriting maritime insurance. Congressman 
Murray estimated that the policy saved the farmers of the United States 
$400,000,000.S6 Only slowly did the government move to underwrite maritime 
insurance; it followed the same pace on the issue of the cotton loan fund. 
Administered by the newly created Federal Reserve Board, the 
$13S,OOO,OOO cotton loan fund was designed to tide the cotton grower over until 
better times. To do so, the Federal Reserve Board, in close consultation with the 
Treasury Department, arranged loans to cotton growers that were secured by 
cotton on the basis of six cents per pound. S7 But became banks and 
corporations would be providing the funding, President Wilson was cautious in 
his support for the program. Wilson expressed his hope that the loan fund would 
not violate anti-trust laws, but to protect his position Wilson wrote his Attorney 
31 
General for an opinion on the subject.58 Attorney General T.W. Gregory wrote 
back to Wilson, assuring him that the cotton loan fund did not violate any 
anti-trust laws. 59 After this final legal okay the plan was implemented, but the 
program did not solve the cotton grower's main problem, the loss of European 
markets. 
Nor is it clear whom the program aided the most. While the program did 
provide the cotton growers with dearly needed funds, it did so at the e?Cpense of 
under-valuing their cotton since money was loaned on the basis of 6 cents per 
pound. The Sapulpa, Oklahoma chapter of the Socialist Party considered the 
program a farce. In a letter to Congressman Murray, the Sapulpa Socialists 
ranted against the loan fund, arguing that "when the cotton farmer sent up a wail 
of distress what did the government do? Why it held conferences, shed 
crocodile tears, and finally ... solved the problem by raising a fund of one 
hundred and thirty five million dollars and loaned it at a low interest to bankers of 
the cotton belt to use in buying up the cotton at from 3 to 4 cents less per pound 
than it cost to raise it. "60 The Commercial and Financial Chronicle agreed with 
this assessment. It remarked that the price of cotton was still two cents below 
production costs. In a final swipe at the loan· program The Commercial and 
Financial Chronicle argued that loans did not consume cotton, only demand did 
this.61 Unable to restore demand for cotton, the federal government largely 
stuck to its pre-war cotton policy. One part of this policy was the Smith:-Lever 
Act, also known as the Cotton Futures and Grain Standards Acts. 
The Smith-Lever Act's purpose was to regulate dealings in cotton futures 
and to compel the use of government grading standards for cotton and grains. 
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The Secretary of Agriculture recommended adoption of the program, arguing it 
would aid in the marketing of commodities.62 The main attraction of the act was 
its advocation of grading standardization. This would protect the naive cotton 
grower from unscrupulous cotton buyers. The agricultural press of the era cited 
many examples of this unjust practice. 
The Oklahoma Farm Journal cited one infraction at Erick, Oklahoma where 
"a range of six dollars was found between the high and low paid for four bales of 
middling cotton, all bought on the same day."63 G.A. Smith, of the G.A. Smith 
Company, responded to this information by commenting that "farmers lose ten 
dollars in cotton country on unfair grading to every one they lose on unfair 
weighing." Smith ended his argument with the statement that in an unregulated 
market "the cotton buyer has too much inducement to act dishonestly."64 
Because of reports like this the Smith-Lever bill swept through Congress, and 
was made law by Wilson's signature on August 19, 1914.65 The State Board of 
Agriculture commented that the act meant $121,000 for Oklahoma over a ten 
year period. It would not be until 1917 that actual grading standards for cotton 
were established and only after continuing complaints about inaccurate 
grading.66 This was another problem that the cotton grower faced which the 
government only reluctantly addressed, another program by which the 
government offered a partial fix instead of a comprehensive solution. But this 
was generally the government's attitude toward the cotton growers throughout 
the period. 
While the sheer number of government programs designed to aid the 
cotton grower seems impressive enough, the end result was of only limited 
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benefit to the cotton growers; they were mainly only band-aids, temporary 
solutions that allowed the cotton grower to survive, not prosper. While the 
government's underwriting of maritime insurance did reopen some markets, it 
was only of limited value. A large percentage of Europe's markets remained 
unavailable to the cotton growers. The Smith-Lever Act was needed and useful, 
but it was more successful at preventing unscrupulous market practices than at 
providing the cotton growers with what they needed, r,narkets. 
After the disaster of 1914 the cotton growers were fairly successful at 
restoring cotton prices in 1915. Reduced acreage and output pushed the price 
back to the 1 O to 12 cent range.67 Increasing trade with Britain and France 
certainly helped; trade with them increased dramatically in the latter half of 
1915. 68 By the fall of 1916 the Oklahoma farmer-Stockman was reporting that 
"demand is tremendous" for cotton. This paper's editor predicted cotton would 
reach twenty cents per pound, a bit optimistic.69 Oklahoma cotton prices did 
rise to 17.03 cents per pound.70 So while the cotton men did weather the crisis, 
it was not due to any help from the government. The situation was completely 
different for the wheat farmers. 
The wheat farmers were in far better shape than the cotton growers; prices 
for their product had risen throughout the entire war. For the average Oklahoma 
wheat farmer August, 1914 was a watershed event. When the war in Europe 
began the United States owed Europe $250,000,000. 71 Here was Ameri.ca's 
chance to turn the tables. It became apparent almost immediately that wheat 
was to play an important role in this turnaround. Harlow's Weekly reported on 
August 1, 1914 that wheat prices rose 4 cents following the news of war in 
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Europe. 72 As wheat prices continued to rise the federal government concluded 
that with wheat exports the United States could pay its debts to Europe. A 
joint-statement by Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo and financier J.P. Morgan 
underscores the government's commitment to this policy. McAdoo and Morgan 
proclaimed that "the policy of the Administration ... is to expedite as rapidly as 
possible the shipment of our grain to Europe and to thus pay maturing debts with 
wheat."73 With statements like this wheat farmers saw only rosy times ahead. 
In September, 1914, wheat farmers were predicting that prices would 
reach $1.50 soon. With the price already at $1.32 per bushel on September 4, 
these predictions quickly became true. Unlike the cotton growers, the wheat 
farmers did not lose their export trade in the fall of 1914. Instead, market 
analysts were commenting that "demand for wheat exported to Europe and 
prices much of the time have been strong." Leaving no doubt regarding who 
was responsible for the upswing in prices, analysts stated that "foreign 
governments have been buying in this country."74 The Oklahoma Farm Journal 
reported that Europe's "ships came to our ports for our wheat and the price is far 
higher than last year." Nor was the Oklahoma Farm Journal affected by pangs of 
guilt about the situation. Its editors proclaimed that "we are glad that wheat can 
be sold at a good price for we need the money so badly."75 Even the 
advertising of the period reflected the changing times. The Yellow Pine 
Manufacturers' Association advocated that wheat farmers build granaries - of 
course, using Yellow Pine lumber - because "Europe is going to bid for your 
grain this winter. When prices go up, YOU should reap the profit - not the 
speculator."76 
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Throughout the fall of 1914 wheat market analysts had to stretch their 
vocabularies to the limit to properly describe the wheat market. Comments such 
as "recent exports of wheat have been so large as to excite remark" only began 
to express market conditions. When exports increased to 400,000 bushels a 
day, one analyst remarked "What next?" The Commercial and Financial 
Chronjcle's comment that "foreign demand is considered unprecedented" 
seems an understatement. Wheat exports in September 1913 had been 
17,957,000 bushels; in September, 1914 exports increased to a record 
31,269,000 bushels~ Exports by October, 1914 were running from 550,000 to 
1,000,000 bushels a day. Commodities brokers deadpanned: "Europe acts as if 
it was badly in need of wheat."77 Grain shipments from Galveston, where most 
Oklahoma wheat was shipped from, also reflect the great increase in wheat 
exports. In October, 1913, grain shipments from Galveston totaled 239,022 
bushels. In October, 1914, this figure swelled to 4,853,330 bushels, an increase 
of twenty-fold. 78 
Despite such comments as "wheat has advanced, partly owing to big 
export demand" and "wheat reached a new higtl level", not all were happy 
profiting from only one side in the European war. 79 Many believed that as 
neutrals United States citizens had the right to trade with other neutrals. The fact 
that their products were being trans-shipped on 'to the belligerents did not bother 
those who supported this position. When the British pressed the Dutch 
government into taking over the Netherlands grain trade, thus preventing 
shipments on to Germany, the Millers' National Federation howled in protest. 
They argued, probably with hyperbole, that their business was "practically at a 
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standstill because of these hindrances. n80 Except for those whose urge for 
profits never would have been satisfied, most individuals associated with the 
wheat markets in the fall of 1914 must have been overjoyed. Because of record 
prices the value of the Oklahoma wheat crop in 1914 amounted to $39,890,000. 
This was more than three times the $12,532,000 value for the 1913 Oklahoma 
wheat crop.81 Greatly increased demand from Europe was driving wheat to 
record highs. When 1915 began The Commercial and Financial Chronicle 
argued that the situation was likely to continue because "Europe is evidently 
nervous over the question of future supplies" of wheat. 82 
The year 1915 began with wheat prices continuing to soar. Wheat 
reached $1.45 in Chicago and $1.25 in Oklahoma City during January. When 
the millers and bakers, major consumers of wheat, accused the President of the 
Chicago Board of Trade of creating high flour prices, he accused the wheat 
farmers of holding back their product. This accusation seems false. Records 
indicate that United States exports of wheat peaked in December, 1914 with 
37,000,000 bushels being sent overseas. Throughout 1915 exports ran high, 
ranging from 12,000,000 to _32,000,000 bushels per month, but nowhere near 
the 37,000,000 bushels of December, 1914.83 
With such bright prospects, wheat acreage and production increased 
greatly nationally in 1915. In 1915 United States wheat farmers produced 
1,026,000,000 bushels of wheat, an increase of 135,000,000 bushels over the 
891,000,000 bushels produced in 1914.84 In Oklahoma 500,000 more acres 
were planted in wheat in 1915 than in 1914.85 The President of the Oklahoma 
State Board of Agriculture predicted in July 1915 that the state would harvest a 
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record 46,649,000 bushels that year. 86 Drought reduced this figure to 
37,015,681 bushels.87 But because wheat prices were up 34 percent the 
Oklahoma wheat crop for 1915 was worth only $2,545,000 less than the 1914 
crop. 88 This pattern was prevalent throughout the war years with regard to the 
value of the Oklahoma wheat crop. Acreage and production decreased 
throughout the war due to drought, but total crop value increased annually. 89 
Rising prices protected the wheat farmer from loss of income due to drought. 
National figures also highlight the huge increase in wheat prices from 
1914 to 1915. Exports of wheat in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1914 were 
worth $87,900,000. In 1915 this figure rose to $333,500,000, more than a 
three-fold increase. The $245,600,000 increase in wheat exports can be 
contrasted with the $234,200,000 decrease in the value of cotton exports for the 
same period. 90 
Because of the continuing drought wheat production in 1916 dropped off 
from the record production of 1915. This held true for both national and 
Oklahoma production. While in 1915 the United States produced over one 
billion bushels, 1916 production amounted to only 639,886,000 bushels. 
Oklahoma wheat production fell from 37,000,000 bushels in 1915 to only 
27,000,000 in 1916.91 But while lower production reduced exports to Europe, 
price increases continued throughout 1916. 
Despite rising prices wheat exports to Europe increased in 1916. 92 The 
Oklahoma Farmer-Stockman commented that "demand is tremendous" for 
wheat. 93 Its editor remarked that "there does not seem to be any limit to the 
possible price of wheat." Certainly, the $1.38 per bushel that Oklahoma farmers 
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received for their wheat was the best price they had ever seen. 94 But the 
drought, high European demand, and the resulting high prices were creating 
new problems, shortages, and speculation. 
A letter from the United Bakers of Greater New York and Vicinity to 
Governor Williams highlights the wheat shortage that was developing. The 
bakers noted that the United States wheat crop for 1916 "was just sufficient to 
cover the wants of the United States," and because 200,000,000 bushels of that 
crop had already been exported to Europe, a shortage was sure to arise. The 
bakers also remarked that "the wheat situation is not so much a question of 
prices as of adequate supply." The bakers closed their argument for protecting 
food supplies with the comment, "we believe in feeding America first at the old 
standard price."95 But shortages and high demand created conditions 
conducive to speculation. 
As speculation helped fuel price increases in 1916, measures were 
proposed to limit its effect on commodity prices. After Congressman Murray 
introduced legislation that would have abolished futures in agricultural products, 
individuals began to rally to his side. While some authors argued that futures 
were necessary for both speculative and protective purposes, others disagreed 
strongly with this viewpoint.96 While some called wheat futures necessary, 
others called it "wheat gambling." Those who supported this position argued 
that the only cure for high food prices was "to destroy speculation."97 But for the 
moment this argument fell upon deaf ears. Only after United States entry into 
the war and the resulting wave of price increases did the government move to 
moderate the price of wheat. 
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Overall, government policy was beneficial to the wheat producers in the 
1914-1916 period. Government aid certainly was not needed, but on the other 
hand, the government made no real effort to limit the rising price of wheat during 
the period. But things would change in the coming months. The federal 
government would soon be actively intervening in the wheat farmers' lives, both 
helping and hindering. 
Throughout the years of World War One in which the United States was a 
neutral, the United States government's policies toward the cotton and wheat 
growers were in sharp contrast. The federal government felt no great urge to aid 
the cotton grower~ in their plight. Congressman Murray's aforementioned 
comments on this subject clearly highlighted his attitude - as did the remarks of 
Wilson, Houston, and McAdoo. The editorials of the press also tend to support 
this conclusion. The programs that the government did come up with benefited 
the bankers and the merchants as much as, if not more than, the cotton growers. 
One could characterize the government's concern for the cotton growers as 
lukewarm at best. 
Its attitudes toward the wheat producers was completely different. Instead 
of the lackadaisical attitudes it displayed toward the cotton growers, the 
government was much more responsive to the wheat prod_ucers' needs. When 
fantastic opportunities developed for the wheat exporters, the government 
quickly moved "to expedite as rapidly as possible the shipment of our grain to 
Europe." No such concern was shown toward the cotton growers and the huge 
surplus they held in 1914. Only sharp reductions in acreage and increasing 
demand from the Allies would eliminate the cotton surplus. In wheat the 
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government saw an opportunity to erase the United States debt to Europe. It 
was in wheat that the government put its trust. When drought conditions 
threatened wheat production, the government would be there to aid the wheat 
producers. But throughout the period laissez-faire doctrine and complacency 
shaped the government's attitude toward the cotton growers, while dollar signs 
and concerns about food supplies marked government policy toward the wheat 
producers. 
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CHAPTER Ill 
COTTON, WHEAT, AND THE AMERICAN WAR EFFORT, 1917-1918 
Well before United States entry into World War One economists were 
commenting that whatever the outcome, "we shall in any event have reaped 
great. commercial advantages from this war."1 This was the prevailing attitude of 
America from 1914 to 1916 as business leaders kept to a strictly dollars and 
cents philosophy. As long as the United States' interests were not gravely 
threatened, neutraUty was the most profitable stance for American business 
interests. But this idyllic situation came to an abrupt end with Germany's 
announcement of their resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare. It was 
only_ with this dramatic shift in German policy that American business accepted 
that profits could no longer be their paramount concern. 2 But what is important 
for the purposes of this study was the varying reactions of the cotton and wheat 
markets to Germany's announcement, and to United States entry into the 
conflict. While cotton was no longer the forgotten commodity, its significance still 
paled in comparison to the importance given to wheat. 
The cotton market's response to the news of Germany's resumption of 
unrestricted submarine warfare was not unlike its response to the beginning· of 
the European war. Although the cotton exchanges did not close this time, prices 
slumped in a fashion similar to what had happened in 1914. The Daily 
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Oklahoman reported that the cotton markets "staggered today under the 
heaviest blow it ever received."3 The Commercial and Financial Chronicle 
argued that "nothing like it perhaps has ever been seen by the cotton trade of 
the present generation if, indeed, ever in the history of the New York market."4 
Germany's announcement initially caused the price of cotton to drop thirty 
percent. Whereas cotton had been at 17 1/2 cents per pound, it lost 5 cents per 
pound following Germany's announcement.5 Fearing that they would be unable 
to fulfill their obligations, traders rushed to sell long contracts, and prices fell as a 
result. After the initial slump cotton prices did rebound to their original levels 
and even began to advance, but only on a limited basis. 
Throughout February and March, 1917 the cotton markets remained 
volatile as· traders reacted to events occurring on the high seas and in the 
world's capitals. No firm pattern was established as prices rose and fell 
according to events on the international scene. But one clear assertion can be 
made from a study qf the interim between Germany's announcement and 
Wilson's call for a declaration of war. Cotton prices did not rise in a rapid 
fashion. After a modest rise of 2 points, or .02 cents on February 8, The Daily 
Oklahoman remarked that the cotton "market bulges once more, but it is small 
and tame affair."6 This pattern continued as the price of cotton rose each time 
news came of another ship sunk and fell with a rumor that British ships would 
transport grain before cotton.7 This seems to be the pattern for the period as the 
market was pulled in opposite directions by war jitters on one hand and 
concerns about shipping on the other. These conditions continued after United 
States entry into the war. 
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The cotton market's response to Wilson's appeal to Congress for a 
declaration of war was a price increase to a record high of 19 cents per pound. 8 
This was up 7.75 cents since February 1.9 In Oklahoma the price of cotton rose 
from 12 to 18 cents at the same time.10 But fears about shipping shortages kept 
' 
prices from rising further at that time. The Daily Oklahoman reported on April 5 
that the liquidation of long contracts was pushing the price of cotton 
downward.11 This constant fear of being unable to fulfill long-term contracts 
plagued the cotton markets throughout the war; export figures clearly illustrate 
the problem. 
Cotton exports to Europe from January 1, 1917 through mid-April 1917 
show a declin·e of 1, 165,348 bales from the same period in 1916, 3,045,496 
bales short of 1915 exports, and 1 ,201 ,465 bales less than the disastrous year 
of 1914.12 These figures indicate that even with increased Allied demand, the 
cotton exporters had been hurt, not helped by the European war. Even with 
Allied demand increasing, The Cdmmercial and Ejnancjal Chronicle repo.rted in 
late April that "exports are now very small" and the result was a "big fall of 
prices."13 The problem of lack of shipping was the key f~ctor responsible for the 
decline in both exports and price. 
Just how sensitive the cotton markets were to shipping requirements is 
remarkably clear. After the government announced the loss of 400,000 tons of 
shipping the price of cotton fell. The Commercial and Financial Chronicle 
remarked that "people here are apprehensive as to (the) future of cotton 
exports."14 There was no doubt who was last in line at the loading docks. The 
Commercial and Financial Chronicle addressed this question when it stated that 
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"many believe that now that the United States is in the war shipping will be 
largely monopolized by this government for the transportation of food, munitions, 
and troops, so that exports of cotton, apart from the submarine menace are, in 
their opinion, bound to suffer."15 Exports certainly were suffering, but the price 
increases throughout the summer of 1917 helped soften the impact of low export 
volume. 
By mid-June the price of cotton passed the 25 and 34 cent levels in 
Liverpooi.16 Nearing the end of the month the price was up to 27.40 cents per 
pound. The Commercial and Financial Chronicle attributed the price rise to 
increased demand by the cotton mills. Being under contract to the government, 
it was a must that the mills remain supplied, and they accordingly bid up the 
price in their haste to obtain cotton stocks. It was uncertain just how high the 
price of cotton would go. 
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle suggested that "cotton will go 
just as high as trade interests can afford to pay." But many cotton growers 
feared that the price would drop once the 1917 crop came on the market and 
that they would be "unable to take advantage of the price levels now 
prevailing ... 17 But for the first time since the opening hostilities of the war a 
prediction of dire straits for the cotton growers did not materialize. 
The fall of 1917 was a time of great expectations for cotton growers. 
Harlow's Weekly reported that cotton farmers were demanding 30 cents a pound 
for their product and getting it.18 The Commercial and Financial Chronicle 
contended that a "few farmers" were even demanding 35 to 40 cents per pound. 
Others began to think of more than just profits. The Oklahoma Farmer-Stockman 
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mentioned that with 30 cent cotton costing only 8 1 /2 to 1 O cents per pound to 
produce, Oklahoma's cotton growers were going to make a healthy profit -
healthy enough that tenants could become landowners with the profits from their 
1917 crop. This statement must have struck fear into the heart of wealthy 
landowners like Governor Williams who saw the owner-tenant relationship as an 
integral part of the social order.19 With reports that the South Sea variety, a 
superior strain of cotton grown in the southern United States, was selling for the 
unheard of price of 50 cents per pound, Oklahoma cotton growers were on track 
for a record year.20 
Although 1917 was not a record year for cotton production, high prices 
made it the most profitable year ever for Oklahoma's cotton growers. The 
959,000 bales produced was a significant increase over the 824,000 bales 
produced in 1916, but still far short of the 1,262,000 bales produced in 1914. 
But because of the average price of 25.85 cents per pound received in 1917 the 
value of the crop was a record $123,961,000. This figure represented a near 
doubling of the $70, 123,000 value for the 1916 crop and three times that of the 
1914 crop that was worth $43,230,000.21 With cotton at record highs and wheat 
subject to government price-fixing, cotton was more profitable to grow than 
wheat. George Bishop of the Oklahoma Farmer-Stockman published statistics 
showing that cotton produced a return of $47.77 per acre, while wheat produced 
a return of only $25.50 per acre.22 Perhaps cotton was "King Cotton" after all. 
But with prices for all products rising as fast as cotton, if not faster, those 
associated with cotton were not entirely satisfied with the situation. When efforts 
were made to include cotton in the Food Control bill and with it a fixed price for 
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cotton, they sought to turn this to their advantage by lobbying for a minimum 
price for cotton. 
One effort in this vein was a letter from the Louisiana Department of 
Agriculture and Immigration to Governor Williams. Complaining that "the price of 
cotton is entirely out of line with other commodities", a state official 
recommended that plans be devised that would guarantee the cotton growers a 
price for their product that was in line with the price increases of other 
products. 23 Statistics tend to lend support to this argument. Prices for cotton 
peaked at less than 190 percent of a 1910-1914 average for all commodities, 
while all commodities rose nearly 230 percent over the 1910-1914 average.24 
One cotton grower complained that wool prices were up 500 percent, with no 
rise in production costs, while the price of cotton only doubled as production 
costs tripled.25 But the Governor, a self-made man, was more inclined to place 
his faith in the free market system than in a fixed minimum price. 
Williams' preference for the open market is revealed in his 
correspondence. When an Ardmore cotton grower wrote to the Governor asking 
for his help at fixing the price of cotton at no less than 25 cents per pound, the 
Governor's return letter noted that there was "a very determined effort on the part 
of practically all the representatives of the South to oppose such action."26 One · 
author noted that only the shoe manufacturers wer~ more stubborn than the 
cotton growers in their resistance to government price-fixing.27 Another who 
agreed with this viewpoint was the Governor of Alabama, Charles Henderson, 
who wrote to Williams arguing against price controls, maintaining that "cotton 
has never advanced to such a price as in any way to jeopardize a fair return to 
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the textile industries."28 But despite his support of the free market, the 
Governor's actions often did not seem to follow this philosophy, nor did they lend 
support to the cotton growers of Oklahoma. 
When part of the 1918 wheat crop failed due to drought, many Oklahoma 
farmers replanted in cotton instead of wheat. 29 With cotton more profitable this 
seemed a wise financial decision. The Governor's response was to write to the 
Secretary of Agriculture to urge that he release a statement "emphasizing (the) 
necessity (of) increased production (of) food in such sections and that (the) 
statement should be sufficiencly (sic) drastic (enough) to arouse farmers in such 
sections to the danger of failing to produce their own food stuff."30 This letter is 
an indicator of Williams' lack of support for the Oklahoma cotton grower. Even 
when it was certain that the price of cotton was to be fixed, Williams' support was 
no greater. 
After Oklahoma cotton growers lobbied Williams to support their demand 
for 35-cent cotton, the Governor relayed the information to President Wilson. But 
Williams attached a qualifier to the statement, claiming that regardless of 
Wilson's decision, Williams would give "my hearty cooperation and support" to 
whatever price the President chose.31 This was not exactly going overboard in 
support of the cotton growers. But generally this was a predicament that the 
cotton growers faced throughout the war, lack of representation. 
A letter from the editor of The Cotton Grower to Goven:ior Williams clearly 
highlights this problem. Its editor complained that despite the importance of 
cotton to the war effort, the cotton growers suffered from a "lack of representation 
at Washington." The editor further remarked that after the War Industries Board 
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was created the cotton growers had "no representation on any of the 
governmental boards." He went on to remark that "because of the fact of RAW 
COTTON having no representation on the War Boards at Washington," the 
cotton grower had become the "vassal-victim" of the manufacturers. 32 The 
Chairman of Georgia's Council of Defense also wrote to Williams emphasizing 
the need for the cotton growers to be represented on the National War Industries 
Board.33 Cotton's lack of representation in Washington certainly was a factor in 
its trouble in 1914 and again in 1917 and 1918. perhaps the formation of the 
Cotton Producers Association in 1933 was twenty years too late for the cotton 
growers. 34 If it had been in place during the war, it is possible that the cotton 
producers could have been more successful in marketing their crop than they 
were. 
The 1918 Oklahoma cotton crop was extremely small. Boll weevils and 
drought had a dramatic and severe impact on cotton that year. The 
government's call for switching to foodstuffs had gone largely unheede~. While 
Oklahoma farmers planted 3,081,847 acres in 1917, they planted 3,074,628 
acres in 1918, a reduction of only 7,219 acres. Only slightly reduced acreage 
had little impact, but the boll weevil and drought did. Cotton production in 
Oklahoma in 1918 was only half of what it had been in 1917. Oklahoma cotton 
growers produced 951, 121 bales in 1917, and only 473, 215 in 1918.35 
Production per acre fei1 from 959 bales in 1917 to only 577 bales in 191 a.36 
While cotton may have been selling for 35 cents at the major trading 
centers, the prices Oklahomans received for their 1918 crop were up only 
slightly from 1917. In 1917 their crop was worth 25.85 cents per pound and in 
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1918, 27.35 cents per pound, an increase of only one and one-half cents per 
pound. Because of relatively stable prices, and a crop diminished by boll weevil 
and drought, the value of the 1918 Oklahoma cotton crop was significantly 
reduced. While it had been worth $123,961,000 in 1917, the 1918 cotton crop 
brought in only $78,889,000, a decrease in value of $45,072,00o.37 
Considering that this was in a time of great inflation, the high price of cotton 
prevented what could have been a disastrous situation for the cotton growers. 
·One can only speculate how high the price of cotton would have gone in 
1918 if the cotton growers had had better represen.tation in the government. The 
Cotton Grower charged that if raw cotton prices had risen at the same rate as 
finished cotton products, the raw staple would have been selling for 50 to 75 
cents per pound. The Cotton Grower claimed that the main culprits in the crime 
were the "cotton exchange bandits." It argued that the "cotton robbers"' efforts 
had meant a loss of over a half-billion dollars to the nations cotton producers. 38 
Others took a similar tack in their criticisms of the cotton exchanges. 
Complaints about the cotton exchanges had been persistent throughout 
the war. Congressman J. Thomas Heflin complained that "bear operators" on 
the New York cotton exchange were conspiring to hold down the price of cotton. 
Heflin ~tated that "I am convinced that such a conspiracy exists."39 An aide to 
Governor Williams also pointed a finger in a similar direction. Highlighting the 
fact that the 1918 cotton crop was the smallest in four years, the aide accused 
the "bear interests" of "using their power to beat down the price."40 Although the 
evidence is fragmentary, it seems that the cotton exchanges were another 
roadblock on the cotton grower's road to fiscal security. One of many. 
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The Oklahoma cotton farmer faced many obstacles in 1918. Natural 
calamities such as the boll weevil and drought took their toll, but so did the 
"cotton exchange bandits" and a government unresponsive to the cotton 
growers' needs. Certainly, 1917 and 1918 were significantly better than 1914. 
At least in the latter years of the war cotton growers had a market and a good 
price for their product. While foreign markets never recovered to pre-war levels 
during the war, the growth of the United States market helped lessen the impact. 
High prices were nice, but inflation·and skyrocketing labor costs cut into profits 
already shrunken by drought and pestilence. Had the government served the 
cotton growers' interests better, it is possible that the collapse of cotton prices in 
1920 could have been prevented, or at least the impact of it lessened. But one 
must remember it was not the cotton growers' plight that the government was 
most interested in. Its attention was focused more on victory and food supplies, 
and that meant wheat. 
When news of Germany's resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare 
broke in the wheat markets, the reaction of the wheat exchanges initially was not 
unlike that of the cotton markets. At first the price of wheat fell 15 cents, down 
from $1.80 per bushel. 41 But this was the one similarity between the two 
markets. After recovering from the initial slump, the wheat market went on a 
rampage. On February 4, 1917 The Daily Oklahoman reported that "wheat shot 
skyward today" and that the 167 7/8 cents per bushel that Oklahoma farmers 
were receiving at the local markets for their wheat was "the greatest change that 
values have shown in a single day since the beginning of the European war."42 
This comment was only a small harbinger of things to come. Prices rose steadily 
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through February and March, 1917. By March 31, 1917, The Commercial and 
Financial Chronicle could comment that "wheat advanced to a new plane. It is 
the highest since 1864." Only the day before wheat was selling for $2.22 per 
bushel in Chicago.43 After Wilson's call for war, The Daily Oklahoman 
remarked that "this was a day of record-making in the grain trade as record 
prices were set." Even in Oklahoma's local markets wheat' was "in sight of $2 
figure."44 For a while there seemed to be no limit to how high wheat prices 
would soar. 
In April and May 1917 wheat prices continued to zoom upward. When 
wheat in the local Oklahoma markets rose to $2.02 The Daily Oklahoman 
reported that the-"price of wheat smashes records."45 In New York wheat was 
selling for $2.47 a bushel in early April.46 In late April The Commercial and 
Financial Chronicle reported that wheat was selling for prices "much higher than 
recently" as #1 spring wheat reached $2.61 a bushel. May 1917 ushered in 
$3.00 per bushel wheat. When it was announced that 31 percent of the 1917 
winter wheat crop was abandoned because of drought, high winds, and 
winter-kill, the pri.ce rose even more.47 Psychological factors were beginning to 
influence the wheat markets. Rampant speculation and war jitters were taking 
control. 
Initial attempts to moderate the wheat market were largely unsuccessful. 
On May 15, 1917 the Chicago Board of Trade set a maximum price of $2. 75 for 
July wheat, and $2.45 for September wheat contracts. Their reasoning in this 
move was to "remove the element of speculation from the grain markets." 
President Griffin of the Chicago Board of Trade made a personal appeal to the 
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wheat traders, arguing that even with crop failures and large exports to Europe 
there was plenty of grain available. Griffin went on to comment that hysteria was 
the cause of the huge price increases in wheat. 48 These actions did little to 
thwart the rising wheat market. The very next week wheat rose to $3.50 for #2 
Red in New York.49 With prices doubling in only four months, complaints about 
the situation began to reach a fever pitch. 
As bread prices soared the American public and its government were not 
slow to criticize the profits wheat speculators were making. Harlow's Weekly 
commented that the public ·was annoyed by "war profits."50 Secretary of the 
Navy Josephus Daniels stated in a speech at a meeting of the editors of 
communications journals that the war profiteer was "little less than a traitor." 
Speaking to a meeting of coal producers, Daniels remarked that it was a crime 
· to make more than normal profits. 51 Perhaps Assistant Secretary of Agriculture 
Carl Vrooman put it best when he characterized food speculators as "vicious, 
recalcitrant Americans, vultures and cormorants, who will be clubbed into 
submission by Congress."52 Both the speculators' actions and the 
government's response show the importance of food and the need for 
governmental controls over it during wartime. 
Bradfor Knapp, a writer for the Oklahoma Farmer-Stockman, put it 
succinctly when he stated that "the war in Europe today is mainly a contest for a 
supply of food."53 Carl Williams, editor of the Oklahoma. Fp,rmer-Stockman, 
contended that "the most important question before the world is apparently that 
of grub."54 Others had tried unsuccessfully a few months earlier to end the war 
by advocating that the government prohibit the shipping of any food to any 
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European nation at war. 55 With the importance of food supplies well 
established, the government began to move toward controlling the nation's food 
supplies. 
One of the government's first moves to regulate food supplies was the 
naming of Herbert Hoover to head a committee on food supply and prices. 
Hoover's effort connected with Belgian relief were well-known, and many 
believed his managerial skills made him well suited for the task at hand. The 
first of Hoover's duties was to "advise as to proper methods of preventing 
recurrence, so far as practical, of the evils arising out of speculative prices, and 
to stimulate production of all food supplies."56 A longer-range plan for Hoover 
and the government was the adoption of a plan that included regulation of food 
supplies "to insure a satisfactory conclusion of the war with Germany."57 This 
policy took shape in the form of the Lever Food· bill, also known as the Food 
Production and Food Control bill. 
The original food control bill was a wide-sweeping act tha,t would have 
given enormous power to the president and to the food administrator (Herbert 
Hoover). At its inception the bill gave the chief executive broad powers 
concerning food production, distribution, and regulation. Because this policy 
was to be implemented through the food administrator's office, it gave that 
administrator considerable power also. A later version of the bill included a 
provision to prohibit use of foodstuffs in the production of alcohol. 59 But before 
any sort of food control bill could be passed, full deliberation of its content was 
necessary. 
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The food control bill was fiercely debated. It is difficult to characterize 
those who favored and opposed such legislation. Some in business favored it; 
others were adamant in their criticism of it. The farmers were no different. Some 
saw a food control bill as protecting their profits, while others saw it as limiting 
their gain. The Oklahoma Farmer-Stockman argued that a food control law was 
necessary to control speculation in grain futures, but feared that the speculators 
. were strong enough to block any sort of legislation that would hobbled their 
efforts. 60 The Commercial and Financial Chronicle took an opposite view. In 
an editorial entitled "The Latest Dictatorship Bill", the Chronicle argued that "we 
are contending now against absolutism abroad; let us beware how we 
unthinkingly set that up at home." The editorial closed with the comment that the 
food control bill was "un-limited and un-American dictatorship."61 But The 
Commercial and Financial Chronicle was not alone; many farmers, and a few in 
government, held the same opinion. 
Most of the opposition to the food control bill came from the true believers 
in laissez-faire doctrine. Oklahoma farmers argued that it was wrong to impose 
a price on wheat that was at least a dollar below market prices. 62 Others put it 
more simply: price-fixing went against the law of supply and demand.63 Still 
others argued that the world grain shortage was great because it insured high 
grain prices, and that only a fool would want price-fixing under such 
circumstances. 64 One market analyst commented that without regulation wheat 
might have gone as high as $4.00 per bushel.65 One of the strongest 
opponents in the government to the food control bill was Oklahoma's own 
Thomas P. Gore. Whether it was out of his belief in free enterprise or out of spite 
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he held for President Wilson, Gore refused to endorse any sort of regulation 
concerning food products. After voting in opposition to the food control bill, Gore 
argued that the legislation cost Oklahoma's wheat farmers $25,000,ooo.66 But 
these voices of opposition were a distinct minority. Representatives from 
non-food producing states favored the bill and formed a majority. 
The food control bill was passed and put into effect in August, 1917. Its 
section #14 empowered the president to fix the price of wheat. Wilson set the 
price at $2.00 per bushel for #1 northern spring· wheat sold in Chicago. 
Oklahoma wheat farmers complained that $2.00 per bushel was a dollar less 
than they had been demanding and getting only a week before. 67 Harlow's 
Weekly went on to comment that Oklahoma's wheat farmers were lucky to have 
a fixed price for their product with a large Australian wheat crop coming on the 
market. 69 Despite their grumbling, the wheat farmers slowly accepted the food 
control bill. As drought continued in Oklahoma, the Food Control Act was a 
stepping stone toward aid for the ~heat farmers as their crop wilted in the 
scorching Oklahoma sun. 
The Emergency Food Production Act was the government's response to 
the drought affecting the wheat farmers of the midwest. Designed to stimulate 
agricultural production, the act included measures for furnishing "seeds for cash 
to farmers in restricted areas where emergency conditions prevailed."70 
Oklahoma was certainly an area where "emergency conditions prevailed." 
Because of the severe drought that was affecting western Oklahoma, much of 
that region's wheat crop failed. This created a shortage of seed for sowing in the 
fall of 1917. The main drawback of the emergency plan was that it did not offer 
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seed on credit or in a give-away program, but strictly on a cash basis. 71 
Congressman Scott Ferris of Oklahoma may have thought the bill "would be of 
much aid to the farmers," but it was not.72 To offer to sell seed to someone who 
has just experienced total crop failure is hardly help at all. But it was more than 
the state government could offer. 
After it was brought to Governor Williams' attention that the 1917 wheat 
crop was reduced by drought, the Governor's response was more vocal than 
substantive. While Williams did appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture for 
assistance and did notify all of Oklahoma's representatives in Washington of the 
predicament back home, he did not offer any state aid to the wheat farmers. 73 
The most the- Governor could offer was a referral to the State Council of 
Defense, which was "trying to work out some plan of aiding the farmers."74 The 
group that gave the nJOSt help to the wheat farmers was a group that had its own 
interests in mind, the bankers. 
With federal aid limited and state aid nearly non-existent, it was the 
bankers of Oklahoma who offered the most to the wheat farmers in 1917. 
Through an organization known as the Tulsa Clearing House, over $225,000 
was loaned to the wheat farmers of western Oklahoma. 75 The sad note is that 
because of the continuing drought, most of the seed planted with the borrowed 
funds also failed. Because the drought's effects were localized, the year 1917 
was a bumper year for most Oklahoma wheat farmers. 
The value of the 1917 Oklahoma wheat crop was nearly double that of the 
1916 crop. Whereas the 1916 crop was worth $37,626,000, the 1917 crop 
brought in a record $71,610,000. Planted acreage was also up significantly 
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from 1916, spurred on by both high prices and government inducements. In 
1916 just over three million acres were planted in wheat; in 1917, 3,735,000 
acres, an increase of 649,000 acres. Drought reduced the actual acres 
harvested to an increase of 230,000 over 1916. The key factor in the greatly 
increased value of the crop was, of course, its price. While Oklahoma wheat 
farmers received $1.38 for their 1916 crop, they received a whopping $2.1 o for 
every bushel of the 1917 crop.76 
As the wheat farmers of Oklahoma surveyed the results of their efforts in 
1917, they began their planning for 1918. Eventually, several plans were 
developed. Oklahoma wheat farmers sought to protect their interests in 1918 in 
three ways. First, they increased their acreage. Second. they lobbied those in 
Oklahoma City and Washington who were sympathetic to their cause for an 
increase in the fixed price for wheat. Finally, the wheat farmers of Oklahoma 
pushed to be represented on the national food commission. 
The most concrete results of this plan were in the area of increased 
acreage. Oklahoma wheat farmers planted a record crop in 1918. Over 
4,000,000 acres were planted in that year. This was an increase of 265,000 
acres over 1917. Drought restricted harvested acres to only 100,000 acres more 
than in 1917, from 3, 100,000 to 3,200,000 acres. 77 
Early in the spring the wheat farmers began their push for an increase in 
the fixed price of wheat. Their efforts were a combination of pleas for fairness 
and thinly-veiled threats; In a letter to Governor Williams, the chairman of an 
organization of wheat farmers argued that in comparison to other commodities 
wheat's value was over $3.50 per bushel. But the wheat farmers stated they 
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were willing to settle for "no less than three dollars" per bushel. In closing their 
argument the wheat farmers hinted that "wheat by far cheapest feed for stock, 
and is being so used." With Europe in desperate need for wheat the threat to 
use it for fodder must have been an effective coercive tool. Moreover, in Senator 
Thomas P. Gore the wheat farmers of Oklahoma had a friend in Washington. 
Gore was .a legislative maverick throughout the World War One era. He 
had opposed Wilson's strict interpretation of neutral rights in the early years of 
the conflict. Once the United States entered the war Gore was adamant in his 
opposition to legislation relating to food control and price fixin.g. Arguing that 
wheat was worth $3. 75 on the open market, ~ore introduced legislation in the 
spring of 1918 that would have raised the fixed price of wheat to $2.50 per 
bushei.79 
Some favored and others opposed Gore's move to raise the price of 
wheat. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels noted in his diary that "Houston 
vigorous in criticizing Gore for bill to increase price of wheat."80 But others 
believed that Gore had not gone far enough. Congressman Richard Morgan of 
Oklahoma stated that he agreed with Gore that wheat was under-priced and 
advocated that wheat not be raised to Gore's suggestion of $2.50 per bushel, 
but to $2.65. Morgan's argument was that wheat was cheaper than corn, rye, 
oats, or barley because ·of the fixed price imposed on wheat.81 Morgan's 
contentions were not accepted readily. It was clear.that $2.65, or even $2.50, 
were unacceptable figures for the Wilson administration. 
Realizing the administration's opposition to a large increase in wheat 
prices, Gore compromised. His next plan was to push through an increase to 
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$2.40 per bushel for #2 wheat sold at the principal interior markets. But Wilson 
vetoed the bill, arguing that it went "against the public interest."82 Later Wilson 
did raise the price of wheat to $2.20 for #1 wheat, and also added Oklahoma 
City, Fort Worth, and Wichita to the list of "basic terminal points."83 This 
increase was evidently not sufficient for Gore. He maintained a steady barrage 
of criticism concerning the price of wheat throughout 1918. 84 
Others were even more livid in their criticisms. Perhaps the harshest 
criticism of the Farmers National Grain Corporation, the federal agency through 
which the grain trade was regulated, came from J.W. Brinton in his Wheat and 
Politics (1931 ). Brinton argued that the agency was "a leviathan parasite 
engrafted upon - and grafting upon - the producers and taxpayers." In another 
statement Brinton maintained that the agency was a "veritable political vampire 
sucking the life blood of the cooperative ~ovement."85 Other works offer a 
much more praising assessment of the National Grain Corporation. 86 
One area the agency oversaw was grain exports to Europe. With Europe's 
grain-producing regions in shambles, United States wheat exports were in high 
demand. Between its entry into the war and January 1, 1918, the United States 
exported 60,000,000 bushels of wheat to Europe. The 0 k I ah om a 
Farmer-Stockman reported that when Europe asked for another 75,000,000 
bushels, America's reply was: "_We will export every grain that the American 
people save from their normal consumption."87 To do this American's resorted 
to "Wheatless Mondays" and war-bread (bread utilizing a higher percentage of 
the wheat berry than in white bread, a forerunner of today's whole wheat bread). 
John A. Simpson, President of the Oklahoma Farmers' Union, advocated a plan 
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where all restaurants would serve free potatoes and charge for bread. Simpson 
argued that in this way millions of bushels of wheat would be freed up for export 
to Europe. 88 The plan was hardly applicable, but it certainly was innovative. 
But all of these actions only partially ameliorated the shortage of wheat due to 
the drought. 
Even with all the calls for increased wheat production the United States 
wheat crop for 1918 was less than it had been in 1914. While the 1918 crop 
was estimated at 572,000,000 bushels, it fell over 100,000,000 bushels shy of 
the 1914 crop. In 1914, 685,000,000 bushels had been produced - in 1918, 
only 572,000,000. The main reason was the drought. Although Oklahoma 
acteage increased by 265,000 acres over 1917, and an unbelievable 1,299,00Q 
acres over 1914, Oklahoma farmers harvested only 36,800,000 in 1918, 
9,050,000 bushels less than in 1914.89 It was clear that drought was affecting 
wheat production in the United States and in Oklahoma. So again in 1918 the 
wheat farmers pleaded for governmental relief. 
Like the cotton growers in 1914, the wheat-producing states banded 
together in 1918 to lobby the federal government for aid. A letter from Kansas 
Governor Arthur Capper to Governor Williams highlights this. Capper argued 
that Kansas and Oklahoma were in a similar predicament and that they should 
join together "to secure this needed help from the federal government through 
the passage of an act by Congress."90 By late summer such an act was law. 
President Wilson announced on July 29, 1918 the creation of a $5,000,000 
fund to make seed loans to wheat farmers stricken by drought. The specifics of 
the program called for seed loans "to farmers whose credit is exhausted by 
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reason of two successive droughts."91 It certainly was not for all wheat farmers. 
An aide to Governor Williams stated that it was for "the man who is absolutely 
without credit."92 It was this sort of prerequisite that led to the program being 
criticized as inadequate and humiliating. 
Oklahoma- state senator Thomas J. O'Neill was counted among those who 
were critics of the program. Calling the situation "desperate", O'Neill argued that 
a special session of the state legislature was needed because of the 
shortcomings of the federal plan. Speaking of the Department of Agriculture, 
O'Neill stated "we are not going to get help from that source." In criticizing the 
Department's plan for seed loans, O'Neill noted that the plan was "so 
cumbersome, and humiliating, that the farmers of our state will not touch it. .. 93 
Even with its limitations and drawbacks, the program did help to increase 
production. 
With the help of the seed loan program Oklahoma wheat production 
increased. Because the plan aided in the fall sowing, its results were not seen 
until 1919. Wheat acreage increased from 4,000,000 acres in 1918, to 
4,723,000 acres in 1919. Production increased substantially from 36,800,000 
bushels in 1918 to 66,052,000 bushels in 1919.94 
Exports also reflected the change. United States wheat exports rose 
significantly from 1918 t~ 1919. Whereas 207,000,000 bushels were exported 
in 1918, 265,000,000 bushels were sent abroad in 1919, an increase of 
58,000,000 bushels. 95 After considering these figures, one must admit that the 
program succeeded in its goal to increase production. 
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In reviewing the 1917-1918 era one can make several conclusions about 
the wheat and cotton markets. Both were strongly influenced by the United 
States entry into World War One - but _in differing ways. Events that caused the 
price of wheat to jump cause the price of cotton to slump. It is obvious that the 
wheat and cotton markets were not operating under the same rules. While it 
was possible to allow cotton to rise and fall according to market conditions, the 
same did not occur in the. wheat markets. The importance of food supplies 
meant much closer governmental supervision of the wheat market. After 
considering the public's cries over high food prices, governmental intervention 
in the wheat market via the Food Control Act was a necessity. Besides limiting 
speculation, the Food Control Act allowed for an orderly distribution of the 
reduced supplies of wheat that were available. But the spirit of laissez-faire 
prevented a large-scale plan to assist the wheat farmers when drought struck in 
1917 and 1918. Had this mood not been so prevalent the blow from the 
massive drop in commodity prices in 1919 might have been cushioned 
somewhat. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE COTTON 
AND WHEAT MARKETS, 1914-1918 
The attitude of the government toward the cotton and wheat producers 
remained consistent throughout World War One. Its policies, more often than 
not, gave preference to the wheat farmers over the cotton growers. The 
tendency of being concerned with food supplies, while neglecting the cotton 
producers, was an affliction that affected more than just those in government. 
The belligerents, the commodities exchanges, and the American public all were 
affected in the same manner, but the federal government, being responsible for · 
the welfare of all those it governed, should not have been so susceptible to such 
a primordial knee-jerk reaction. Had the government provided words of support 
to the cotton market, the unfortunate closing of the cotton exchanges for four 
months in 1914 might have been avoided. 
Besides failing to prevent the closing of the exchanges, the government 
erred in several of its policies toward the cotton producers. The delay in 
underwriting maritime insurance and the failure to allocate sufficient shipping to 
the cotton exporters drastically reduced cotton prices in 1914. Wheat exporters 
had no such problem in sending their product abroad. This was only one area 
where the government neglected the cotton growers. 
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The limited nature of the Emergency Warehouse Credits program was 
another example of the shortcomings of the government's policy toward the 
cotton producers. Instead of attempting to reopen the cotton grower's markets, 
the government made loans to the cotton growers, accepting their warehoused 
cotton as collateral. The main problem with the program was that its loans were 
made on the basis of a six cents per pound price. This figure was well below the 
production cost of ten cents per pound. Also, the six cents figure was less than 
half of the 13 cents per pound that the cotton growers were getting for their 
product just before the outbreak of the war. A final criticism of the Emergency 
Warehouse Credits program is that the total funding of the program 
$235,000,000, was only one-fourth of the value of the 1914 cotton crop if prices 
had held to pre-war levels. Clearly, the program was a stop-gap measure,·not a 
comprehensive solution to the cotton grower's plight. Considering the limited 
value of such a program, it is of little surprise that the cotton growers developed 
their own responses to the crisis. 
The cotton growers were at least as effective, if not more so, than the 
government at restoring the price of cotton to a profitable level. The Emergency 
Warehouse Credits program did little to restore prices to their pre-war levels. 
The "Buy a Bale" program also was limited in nature, but it helped reduce the 
surplus of cotton. Probably the most effective action in this regard was the cotton 
growers' reduction of cotton acreage in 191_5. Oklahoma cotton growers planted 
one-third fewer acres in 1915 than 1914. This effort made room for the 
5,000,000 bale surplus left over from 1914. 
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The statements of President Wilson and Secretaries Houston and McAdoo 
show the federal government's lukewarm reception to the cotton growers'. 
please for assistance. Wilson's unwillingness to try new approaches to a unique 
problem effectively limited the role the government would play in the cotton 
crisis. Secretary Houston's statement that "the Government had done all it can 
do" indicates the self-imposed limitations the government placed on itself in 
1 ~14.1 McAdoo's opposition to aiding the cotton growers was made clear in his 
remark that "it is impossible by legislation to create a market for cotton or to 
establish a price for it. .. 2 If these leaders had pushed for, instead of opposed 
relief for the cotton growers, the hardships that the growers faced in 1914 might 
have been lessened substantially. Fortunately for the cotton growers, 1915 and 
1916 represented a period of recovery. 
Even after United States entry into the war, the government still considered 
cotton a low-priority commodity. The government never advocated increased 
production of cotton; its emphasis was on increased production of foodstuffs. 
When cotton became more profitable on a per acre basis than wheat, the 
government moved to stop cotton growers who were increasing their acreage. 
Governor Williams' telegram to Secretary Houston in the spring of 1918 calling 
the latter's attention to this situation articulated this policy. One can assume that 
the policy was based on two grounds. One, the government wanted more food 
produced, not cotton. Two, with men, munitions, and foodstuffs ahead in line at 
the loading docks, the availability of additional shipping for transport of an 
increased cotton crop seems non-existent. But any solutions for the shipping 
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shortage that the cotton growers faced was prevented by another problem. The 
cotton growers' lack of representation in the government. 
The cotton growers' lack of representation in the government may have 
kept them from receiving the aid they needed. This was true on both the state 
and federal levels. More often than not, Governor Williams sided with the wheat 
farmers - for both political and personal reasons. On the national level it was 
much the same. Only one-fourth of the members of Congress came from cotton 
producing states. This certainly limited congressional aid to the cotton growers. 
Nor were the cotton producers represented on the War Industries Board. This 
condition was what led cotton growers to grumble that they had become the 
"vassal-victim" of the manufacturers. 3 But before too bleak a picture is drawn of 
the cotton grower's plight, one must take into consideration the increasing price 
of that commodity after 1914. 
The rising price of cotton after 1914 kept conditions tolerable for cotton 
producers. Even with the boll weevil, drought, and increasing labor costs, the 
cotton grower was better off in 1918 than in 1914.4 The wheat farmers had 
benefited more, but the cotton growers weathered the crisis of 1914. While most 
cotton growers were better off after 1914, most wheat farmers had their condition 
improve throughout the entire war. 
Wheat farmers never experienced the ups and downs that the cotton 
growers faced. The price of wheat began to rise with the first news of war in 
Europe in 1914, and continued to rise until its price was fixed in the fall of 1917. 
If the public's complaints about high food prices had not led to the fixing of the 
price of wheat, it is hard to speculate how high it would have gone. Even with 
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the price of wheat fixed, the value of the 1918 Oklahoma wheat crop was five 
and one-half times larger than the last pre-war year, 1913.5 The government 
put a cap on wheat profits in 1917, but this was one of the few times when the 
government and the wheat farmers were on opposite sides of a dispute. 
From the beginning of the war the government was in the wheat farmer's 
corner. The joint-statement by Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo and financier 
J.P. Morgan in August 1914 that "the policy of the Administration, ... , is to 
expedite as rapidly as possible the shipment of our grain to Europe" indicates 
that from the onset of the war the government favored the wheat farmers. While 
cotton exports dwindled to almost nothing, wheat exports mushroomed. By 
October 1914 wheat exports were as high as 1,000,000 bushels a day. 6 
Throughout the war wheat received preferential treatment in regard to shipping. 
This policy allowed wheat to be exported in large volume throughout the war. 
While a fixed price limited profits on wheat, large volume exports helped wheat 
farmers pile up profits. Drought, more than anything else, was the main 
adversary of the wheat farmers. 
The drought that affected western Oklahoma in 1917 and 1918 did more to 
upset the wheat farmers' idyllic state than government price fixing. Government 
price fixing only limited profits; the drought wiped out profit, crop, and credit in a 
single blow. The wheat farmers may have successfully withstood government 
price fixing, German submarines, and the creditors up to 1917, but drought was 
more than a match for the small-time agrarian. In some counties no rain fell at 
all for over a year, and the result was two successive crop failures. Even with 
greatly increased acreage Oklahoma's wheat production was less in 1917 and 
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1918 than it had been in 1914. When the wheat farmers increased their 
acreage by 649,000 acres in 1917 over the 1916 crop, two-thirds of the new 
acreage produced nothing. 7 
Despite its preoccupation with increased food production, the 
government's response to the drought-affected wheat farmers was limited. The 
reasons for this are two-fold. First, the drought-stricken regions were localized . 
• 
On a national scale the wheat farmers were producing record crops. The 
drought affected only a region centered over western Oklahoma. With most of 
the wheat-producing areas in find shape it is not surprising that this one region 
did not receive more attention. Second, laissez-faire attitudes permeating 
government limited change. 
The government may have desired increased food production, but there 
were limits to how far this policy could go. Any sort of blanket aid was 
considered untenable by the administration. In 1918 the most the government 
could do was to offer tc:> sell seed to wheat farmers who had lost their crop. This 
was hardly an acceptable proposal for the wheat farmers. Their money had 
been invested in that year's crop, and they had little money for a second planting 
without a harvest in between. With the state government unwilling to pick up the 
slack left by the federal government, it was left up to the bankers to finance the 
1918 crop. 
It was only when the drought stretched into its second year that the 
government moved to aid the wheat farmers. The $5,000,000 fund established 
by President Wilson in July 1918 did prevent total fiscal collapse for some wheat 
farmers, but because the plan was only for "the man who is absolutely without 
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credit" the number of farmers who were helped by the program was limited. The 
program did benefit those who needed the help the most, but did little for those 
who were only on the verge of bankruptcy. It was this shortcoming in the federal 
government's plan that led Oklahoma state senator Thomas J. O'Neill to call for 
a special session of the state legislature. With most wheat farmers prospering 
this call went unheeded. 
The.year 1914-1918 were very beneficial to most wheat farmers. Even at 
fixed prices, wheat in 1918 was 250 percent higher than it had been in 1914. 
There are several reasons for this. F'irst, news of war sent everyone into a frenzy 
to accumulate food supplies, and the result was speculation and higher food 
prices. Second, the high demand for wheat in Europe also pushed the price up. 
Because shipping was available for wheat exports, it allowed demand for that 
crop to be more elastic than demand for cotton. 8 Wheat also had an advantage 
over other food products in regard to export to Europe. Because corn does not 
store nearly as well as wheat, the latter was a much more preferred export 
product. Corn producers were never able to benefit from European demand for 
American foodstuffs as the wheat farmers were. The prosperity that the wheat 
farmers experienced from 1914 to 1918 was only part of a trend that lasted the 
entire decade. 
Wheat increased in value nearly three times more than cotton in the 
decade 1910-1920. In 1909 the United States wheat crop had a value of 
$13,854,322; by 1919 the nation's wheat crop brought in $140, 730,350. This 
was an increase in value of 915.8 percent for the decade. The value of cotton 
increased by 360 percent in the same years. The value of the United States 
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cotton crop in 1909 was $35,399,356; in 1919, $163,011,204. Because the 
price of wheat rose faster than that of cotton, production of wheat in the decade 
also out-distanced increases in cotton production; wheat production for the 
decade increased by 369 percent, while cotton production increased by 81 
percent.9 These figures indicate that demand for wheat was much more elastic 
than cotton, and the result was that wheat prices rose faster than cotton. This 
was a trend that held true throughout the decade, not just the 1914-1918 period. 
In a final comparison of the cotton and wheat markets, it is possible to state· 
that it was the wheat farmers who were more successful in the 1914-1918 
period. In the early phases of the war the wheat farmers enjoyed rapidly 
escalating prices for their product while the price that cotton growers received for, 
their product slumped. Throughout the remainder·of the period that the United 
States was a neutral the price of wheat continued to climb while cotton only 
regained what it had lost in 1914. Both commodities experienced a steep rise in 
their price after February 1917, but once again it was wheat ~hich went up the 
most. If the public's complaints had not led to the price of wheat being fixed, 
wheat would have left cotton even further behind. But the public's actions are 
only more proof that wheat was more important than cotton to nearly everyone in 
the 1914-1918 period. 
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